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COMMENTS
Community Rating: New York's Empire
Blues
JEREMY J. BESTt
INTRODUCTION
Health care and health insurance have caused the nation to
enter a deep crisis.' "[T]he United States spends approximately
fourteen percent of its gross domestic product on health care."2
This figure amounts to over $2 billion per day, or $23,000 per
second.3 The country's exorbitant doctor bill, however, is still
t J.D., May 1998, State University of New York at Buffalo School of Law. B-A., May
1995, LeMoyne College. The author would like to thank Professor Martha McCluskey for
her encouragement and comments. A special thank you is extended to Kristen M.
Scharf-Best for her patience and support, as well as to Michael and Julia Best for being
the inspiration behind this Comment.
1. See Angelo A. Stio HI, Note, State Government: The Laboratory for National
Health Care Reform, 19 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 322, 324 (1994); see id. n.8 (citing The
President's Health Security Report to the American People; Chapter 2, Principles of Re-
form, Oct. 27, 1993, available in 1993 WL 7132185 (stating that "[t]he things that are
wrong with the current system are threatening everything that is right with American
health care)).
2. Id. at 325 (stating that "economists projecting that the number may rise to
nineteen percent by the year 2000."); see also Mark A. Rothstein, Health Care: Public
and Private Systems in the Americas, 17 Coi~P. LAB. L.J. 612, 615 (1996) (comparing the
U.S., which spends 14% of its GDP on health care, to Canada (9.9%), Chile (6.0%) and
Uruguay (8.04%)).
3. See Stio, supra note 1, at 325; see also Richard A. Knox, Americans' Health Bills
Top $1 Trillion, BOSTON GLOBE, Jan. 13, 1998, at A3 (reporting that "Americans' annual
health bill has officially passed the trillion-dollar bench mark and is climbing by about
$48 billion a year... "). But see Robert Pear, Health Spending Grew Slowly in '96 but
Still Hit $1 Trillion, N.Y. TImsS, Jan. 13, 1998, at A15 (noting that in 1996 health
spending increased at the slowest rate since 1960). Experts do not expect health costs to
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failing to provide health care for over forty million people in the
United States. 4 Additionally, there are fifty-six million Ameri-
cans that lack an insurance package that can adequately cover
their needs and an estimated two million Americans who lose
their health insurance coverage each month.5
Health care reform has, of late, been one of the top priori-
ties for the federal government. 6 However, Congress is not cur-
rently working on a health care bill that would effect sweeping
reforms.7 Instead, its focus has been on issues such as private
insurance, pre-existing conditions and portability.8 State govern-
ments are now taking on the struggle over affordable health
care. 9 "[T]wenty percent of an average state's budget [is] being
spent on medical insurance and Medicaid expenditures, and [it
is being projected] that these figures will reach an annual
growth rate of twenty-one percent per year .. ."10 States
throughout the country are initiating health care strategies,
such as community rating, that attempt to cut costs and provide
coverage for all of their citizens."
soar in the near future as they did in the 1980s and 1990s. See Pear, supra.
4. See Stio, supra note 1, at 325.
5. See id. at 325-26; see also Knox, supra note 3 (explaining that even with the 1996
decrease in health spending, the number of uninsured continues to expand steadily).
People continue to decide that they cannot afford individual health insurance or the in-
surance offered by their employer. See generally Knox, supra note 3 (discussing the in-
creases that consumers have experienced in health insurance premiums, as well as the
insurance industry's continued desire to raise rates).
6. See Yevette DeBow, Health Care and the New Congress, INs. & TECH., Jan. 1995,
at 15 (reviewing importance of health care reform for local, state and federal govern-
ment); Bryan Ford, The Uncertain Case for Market Pricing of Health Insurance, 74 BU.
L. REv. 109 (1994) ("Polls reveal that in some areas of the country, health insurance is
viewed as one of the more important issues facing the country."); see also Health Insur-
ance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, Pub.L. No. 104-191, 110 Stat. 1936.
An Act to amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1996 to improve the portability
and continuity of health insurance coverage in the group and individual mar-
kets, to combat waste, fraud, and abuse in health insurance and health care
delivery, to promote the use of medical savings accounts, to improve access to
long-term care services, to simplify the administration of health insurance, and
for other purposes.
Id. This law was passed, in part, to enable people to move between jobs without fear of
being denied coverage by a new employer because of a pre-existing condition.)
7. See Debow, supra note 6, at 15.
8. See id. (anticipating accurately the 104th Congress's agenda with respect to
health care reform); see also Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of
1996, Pub.L. No. 104-191, 110 Stat. 1936.
9. See Stio, supra note 1; Theresa Williams, Note and Comment, 'Going Bare": In-
surance and the Pre-Existing Condition Problem, 15 J.L. & Com. 375, 384 (1995).
10. Stio, supra note 1, at 323.
11. See id. at 322-23.
NEW YORKS EMPIRE BLUES
Part I of this Comment outlines the community rating sys-
tem.12 Part II presents a brief history of community rating, and
the criticisms that surround it. 13 Part III discusses New York's
insurance crisis with Empire Blue Cross/Blue Shield, the State's
attempt at solving the dilemma through the use of community
rating and the results of this attempt.14 Part IV compares com-
munity rating in New York with the community rating efforts in
Maine, Massachusetts, New Jersey and Vermont. 5 Part V con-
cludes by assessing New York's difficulties with community rat-
ing.' 6 The purpose of this Comment is to demonstrate that ad-
verse selection 17 and New York's problems with Empire Blue
Cross/Blue Shield have prevented New York from successfully
implementing its community rating laws and regulations.'8 New
York's willingness to treat Empire preferentially has allowed the
non-profit insurer to become too big to fail. The New York State
Legislature and Insurance Department, as a result, have cre-
ated laws that protect the interests of Empire rather than the
interests of New York's citizens. This legislative action is caus-
ing the State's attempt at health reform to suffer.
I. CommuNiTY RATING
A. History
The market pricing of health insurance is one of the major
problems with American health care. 9 "There are two competing
models of how to provide for the payment of medical [insur-
ance]." 20 The first model is typical of how insurance companies
traditionally operate. The traditional model requires the policy-
holder to pay a premium to the insurer. The premium's actual
12. See infra Part I.
13. See infra Part II.
14. See infra Part III.
15. See infra Part IV.
16. See infra Part V.
17. For an explanation of 'adverse selection," see infra notes 40-50 and accompany-
ing text.
18. See infra notes 51-54 (discussing Empire, a non-profit corporation that is one of
the country's oldest and largest Blue plans; Empire services the New York City, Albany,
and mid-Hudson area); see also infra Parts 11-II (discussing Empire's special treatment
by New York State). This treatment has allowed Empire to become "too big to fail. See
infra notes 51-54. If the company were to become insolvent, thousands of people would
be without coverage and millions of dollars in medical bills would go unpaid. See infra
notes 51-54.
19. See Ford, supra note 6, at 110.
20. Id. (noting that the policyholder is generally an individual). The policyholder
could also be an employer or an organization in the case of group coverage policies.
1998] 469
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price is based on an individual's or group's health risk. "[A]n in-
surance provider prices insurance based on the probability that
the risk being insured against will occur and the amount that
the insurer will have to pay if the risk being insured against oc-
curs."21 The second model of health insurance is known as com-
munity rating. "In this model, individuals pay a certain amount
to be included in a program, but this amount does not relate to
their actual or expected medical care needs or to the amount of
their medical expenses." 22
Community rating is not a new method of insurance pric-
ing; in fact, it has existed for almost sixty years.23 Under this
21. Id. at 115-16. 'The price of insurance, referred to as the gross premium, is com-
posed of two parts: the 'pure premium'-the portion that pays for anticipated losses, and
the 'loading-the cost of selling and administering insurance policies and a risk charge
to cover fluctuations of actual loss from the anticipated losses that were used to calcu-
late the premium' Id. at 116 n.29 (citing J. DAvID CUmMNS ET AL., RISK CLASSIFCATION
IN Lm'E INSURANCE, at 12 (1983)).
22. Id. at 110-11. The author contrasts the traditional model of health insurance
with the community rating model by observing that "[tlhese models of health care pay-
ment are not merely distinct-they are antagonistic to each other." Id. A traditional in-
surance market pricing system undermines the goal of collective insurance by discrimi-
nating against those who are seriously ill and determined to be a high risk. Id. These
individuals are charged a higher premium rate. Id. Similarly, attempts at community
rating regularly undermine actions that are necessary for a "properly working private
insurance market." Id. For example, a traditional insurer's attempt to "exclude from its
membership individuals who have developed catastrophic illnesses in order to preserve
lower rates for other members illustrates this basic conflict." Id.; see also infra notes 39-
49 (discussing the function of community rating and regulation of insurance). More re-
cently, Managed Care has taken center stage in the area of health insurance. See KEN.
NETH S. ABRAHAM, INSURANCE LAW AND REGULATION: CASES AND MATERIALS 372-73 (2nd ed.
1995) ("[Managed Care is provided through Health Maintenance Organizations (HMOs),
Preferred Provider Organizations (PPOs), and 'managed' fee-for-service insurance plans
that require utilization controls and review."); Erik Eckholm, Healing Process-A Special
Report; While Congress Remains Silent, Health Care Transforms Itself, N.Y. TImEs, Dec.
18, 1994, § 1, at 1. Managed care plans control costs by taking an active role in medical
decisions. See Eckholm, supra. Such plans place limits on medical tests, surgery, refer-
rals to specialists and hospital stays that the plans consider unnecessary. See id. Man-
aged care providers also pay lower fees and promote prevention and efficiency. See id.
For the purposes of evaluating insurance, managed care differs fundamentally from the
traditional model of health insurance. See generally James P. Freiburg, The ABCs of
MCOs: An Overview of Managed Care Organizations, 81 ILL. B.J. 584, 584-85 (1993)
('[M]anaged care is a comprehensive term describing a system of health care cost con-
tainment that deviates from the traditional health care delivery system"). This Comment
focuses on the traditional model of insurance and how community rating interacts with
it. The role that managed care plays in the insurance industry is beyond the scope of
this Comment.
23. Williams, supra note 9, at 386.
There are actually two different kinds of community rating: strict community
rating, which requires health insurers to accept all applicants regardless of
their health status and to charge the same premiums, and modified community
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system, all people are provided with health coverage regardless
of their medical history.2' People who have "a pre-existing condi-
tion may still be denied coverage for a limited time, however."25
Community rating also protects individuals from having their
policies terminated by an insurer because of claims they have
filed.26 Under community rating, companies set premium rates
"based on the average number of claims submitted by the gen-
eral public in a geographic area. All of the persons located in
this specific area will then be required to pay a [premium] based
on the amount of risk assessed."27
The idea of health insurance and community rating
originated in the 1930s with the founding of what today is
known as the Blue Cross hospital insurance plans.28 The Great
Depression hampered hospital finances and also created the
need for a system that would cover hospital expense payments.
2 9
Hospitals developed a system that provided certain services to
employers for a set annual fee.30 "Medical societies quickly be-
gan offering similar set-fee arrangements to pay doctors' bills,
and thus created the Blue Shield medical insurance plans."
1
Blue Cross premiums were not based on a projection of individ-
ual health care costs. The rates came from "the average health
care costs of the community in which the provider was
located."32
rating, which would allow insurers to charge different premiums among differ-
ent age groups while barring distinctions on the basis of poor health or pre-
existing conditions.
Williams, supra note 9, at n.79.
24. See id. at 386.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. See id. at 112-13.
29. See id. at 112.
30. See id.
31. Id.
32. Id.; see also Francis J. Serbaroli, The Future Of Blue Cross/Blue Shield Plans,
N.Y. L.J., July 30, 1996, at 3. According to Mr. Serbaroli:
Blue Cross plans . . .[are] generally traced to Baylor University Hospital in
Houston Texas. In 1929, Baylor Hospital was experiencing financial difficulties
because of the inability of patients to afford the costs of their hospitalization.
Officials of the hospitals and the university agreed to experiment by identify-
ing and enrolling groups of subscribers for pre-paid hospital care. For 50 cents
a month, subscribers could receive up to 21 days of hospital care each year.
The first and most obvious group identified and enrolled was Baylor's own
teaching faculty. The idea caught on, and soon other groups of workers in
banks, oil companies and other businesses were included. In short order, other
hospitals were offering competing plans. As individual hospital plans prolifer-
19981 471
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By 1937, the nationwide enrollment in Blue Cross plans
had grown to 800,000. Three years later enrollment soared to
six million.3 3 "[B]y 1980 there were more than 100 [Blue plans]
in existence."34 "Today, there are sixty-three Blue Cross/Blue
Shield plans covering more than sixty-five million subscribers."5
In 1964, the Blue plans grew in financial clout when the federal
government asked Blue Cross/Blue Shield to help administer its
Medicare program.3 6 This contractual agreement helped give the
Blues a competitive edge on the market.37 The Blues also held
competitive advantages over private insurers because of their
non-profit and tax exempt status.38 These advantages, however,
were accompanied by the substantial burdens of having to use
community rating and open enrollment.3 9
ated, the next logical step was to consolidate the collection of premiums and
the processing of claims. In 1932, a community-wide plan was developed in
California in which subscribers paid their premiums to the plan rather than to
the hospitals, thus eliminating competition among individual hospitals and
centralizing administration of the plans. Since they were regarded as a com-
munity benefit, the plans were set up as not-for-profit corporations, which also
helped to keep down costs. These entities came to be known as Blue Cross
plans.
Serbaroli, supra.
33. See Serbaroli, supra note 32, at 3.
Commercial insurers, taking note of this phenomenon, began offering health
care insurance in 1934. They differed from Blue Cross coverage in that most
commercial policies provided for cash payments to be made directly to the indi-
vidual subscriber, rather than to the hospitals. The other significant difference
was that the cash payments made by commercial insurers to their subscribers
could be used to pay either their hospital bill or their physician's bill. Up to
this point, Blue Cross plans only covered their hospitalization expenses and
not the physician's charges incurred during hospitalization. In the late 1930s
and 1940s, the Blue Cross plans worked with physicians to develop another
health insurance program to pay for physician fees incurred by patients during
their hospitalizations, and the Blue Shield plans were born.
Id.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. See id.
37. See id.
For example, hospitals often purchased health coverage for their employees
through the local Blues plan. These hospitals also relied on the plans for
timely payment of their many Medicare and Blue Cross claims. Thus, there
was a significant disincentive for hospitals to shop around for better deals on
their employees' health insurance.
38. See id. (explaining that Blue Cross plans enjoyed tax-exempt status as 501(c)(4)
social welfare organizations).
39. See id. The Blues were usually structured to accept anyone who applied for in-
surance. See id.
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B. Common Criticisms of Community Rating
Many insurance scholars believe that community rating and
open enrollment create unmanageable burdens for insurers.
These experts insist that these regulations prevent the practice
of risk classification, a process which enables an insurer to price
insurance according to an individual's health risks.40 Insurers
normally use "factors that relate to risk, group a large number
of similar risks and insure all members of the risk class at the
same rate."41 An insurance company's use of risk classification
enables it "to set rates in a manner that accurately reflects the
expected loss value of the insurance policy."42
Community rating prevents accuracy in pricing health cov-
erage; something that community rating's detractors contend is
the key to success in the insurance underwriting market.
43 If
the premium cost of a particular class of health risks does not
correspond to its expected loss, or if a classification is estab-
lished that mixes a high health risk class with a low health risk
class, the insurer offering such a classification will not succeed
in the market.44
Individuals who have low health risks, particularly younger
policyholders, who have been placed in a high risk classification
will often choose not to purchase insurance at all.45 Young and
40. See Abraham, supra note 22, at 2-3 (discussing the finction of insurance: risk-
transfer, risk-pooling and risk-allocation).
41. Ford, supra note 6, at 116. "In addition to using classifications, some forms of
insurance also modify rates based on the insured's particular characteristics that influ-
ence the risk of loss Id. at 117 (noting that one example of a common characteristic
could be that the insured individual is a smoker).
42. Id. at 117; see generally Leah Wortham, The Economics of Insurance Classifica-
tion: The Sound of One Invisible Hand Clapping, 47 Omo ST. L.J. 835, 842-51 (1986).
"Health related classifications (for example, blood pressure or medical history) as well as
age, gender, and marital status are taken into account. In individual health/disability
policies, extensive questioning on health history is likely to be taken and factored in,
along with occupation, gender, and age." Wortham, supra, at 849-50.
43. See Ford, supra note 6, at 118. It is important to note that some forms of health
insurance do not involve strict underwriting. See supra notes 20-22 (discussing theories
and methods of administering health insurance).
44. See supra notes 20-22 (discussing theories and methods of administering health
insurance); cf Abraham, supra note 22, at 3 (discussing the obstacle to perfect competi-
tion as being imperfect information). "Without perfect information, the products sold and
the prices charged for them vary from the optimum." Abraham, supra.
45. See Ford, supra note 6, at 118; see also Abraham, supra note 22, at 3-4 (discuss-
ing the problem of adverse selection); Wortham, supra note 42, at 844 ("[P]eople who be-
lieve they are likely to use a particular insurance coverage will be more likely to
purchase it and more willing to purchase it at higher prices than those who see their
risk as remote!).
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healthy people would pay an exorbitant amount of money for
something they neither want nor need. The inflated costs will
strike many of them as unfair, and they will likely retaliate by
"going bare."46 On the other hand, individuals who have a pre-
existing condition or some other costly health care need will
view community rating as a bargain.4 7 The aged and the un-
healthy will flood the insurance pool. The end result will be that
low risk people buy less insurance and high risk people
purchase more. Eventually, only the high risk individuals will
remain in the pool and insurers will have to adjust premiums in
light of these increased risks.4 The insurance that was suppos-
edly available to everyone will now be unaffordable. The ability
to spread risks from those who do not suffer losses to those who
do is removed when community rating splits the market. Simply
put, some experts maintain that insurance is a business that de-
pends on discrimination in order to entice low risk consumers
into the market.4 9 Insurers rely on the ability to rate premiums
based on individual and group characteristics and when this
ability is removed by a regulation such as community rating,
the market suffers from the phenomenon discussed above-ad-
verse selection.50
II. HISTORY AND PROBLEMS LEADING TO COMMUNITY RATING IN
NEW YORK
Rising health care costs have been no different in New York
than in the rest of the country. In 1990, New York health insur-
ance costs soared "with double-digit increases the norm."51 Major
46. See Ford, supra note 6, at 118; see also Williams, supra note 9, at 376 n.1, 387
n.86, ("'Going bare' is a term used by the insurance industry to identify the
uninsured).
47. See Ford, supra note 6, at 118; see also id. at 118 n.40 (observing that commu-
nity rating is a bargain because "those with low risks are paying more than their ex-
pected loss value, effectively subsidizing those with high expected loss values.").
48. See id.
49. See generally Wortham, supra note 42.
50. But see id. at 846 (challenging the market pricing arguments made by insurers).
Insurers choose classifications for reasons other than assessing risk. They also choose
classifications based on "stability, reliability, and administrative convenience." Id. The
classifications used by insurers actually only predict a small percentage of losses. "Insur-
ers are [also] not always under strong pressure to price at expected loss, and insureds
are willing to buy insurance priced at higher than expected cost." Id. at 861. State statu-
tory insurance levels "protect existing companies from competition," thus enabling insur-
ers to keep prices artificially high. Id. Many consumers will accept these prices because
they are so averse to going bare. See id. They may also be unaware that the price is in-
flated. Often, it is simply a matter of consumers behaving irrationally. See id.
51. 1990 N.Y. SUPERITMHNDENT INs. ANN. REP. 2-4 (1991) [hereinafter 1990 ANNUAL
474 [Vol. 46
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factors contributing to this increase included "hospital and phy-
sician fees, increased utilization of existing benefits, defensive
medicine practices, AIDS, and insurance fraud."52 In October
1991, Empire Blue Cross/Blue Shield, which provides coverage
for the downstate New York area and is "one of the country's
oldest and largest Blues plans,"5 requested rate adjustments to
compensate for its increased costs. These requests were denied
by the acting Superintendent of Insurance, Salvatore Curiale.54
Empire filed for another rate increase in December, 1991.
Superintendent Curiale granted approximately one-half of the
increase for individuals and small groups. 55 "The action was nec-
essary due to losses Empire [was] suffering on this business."5 6
Curiale also urged the Legislature to adopt a comprehensive
health reform package so that further rate increases would not
be necessary.57 Empire's biggest complaint was that other insur-
ers, not obligated to employ community rating, were able to
REPORT).
52. Id.
53. Serbaroli, supra note 32, at 3.
54. See 1991 N.Y. SUPERINTENDENT INs. ANN. REP. 3 (1992) [hereinafter 1991 ANNUAL
REPORT] (noting that the rate adjustments would have impacted 350,000 direct pay sub-
scribers and 350,000 small group subscribers in the company's New York region). 'The
first proposal would have significantly increased the rates for certain individual health
insurance (direct pay) contracts. The second would have introduced a new rating meth-
odology to divide Empire's community-rated pool into two categories-one for groups
with unfavorable health histories and one for all others .... Empire estimated that
rates would have ballooned by as much as fifty percent for some poor risk groups, while
some healthy groups would have seen decreases of an equivalent amount." Id.; see also
Curiale Says No to Empire Proposals, THE BuLLETIN (New York State Insurance Depart-
ment), Sept.-Oct. 1991, at I [hereinafter Curiale Says No, TBE BULLETIN]. Curiale de-
cided to have BC/BS "monitored monthly rather than quarterly." Curiale Says No, THE
BuLLETIN, at 1. This change would "allow the Superintendent to respond quickly" to the
company's depleting surplus. Id. "As of June 30, 1991 Empires' surplus had fallen to
$238.2 million-a $56.3 million decline since the beginning of the year." Id. Empire's pro-
posal to split the existing community rated pool was an attempt to prevent "the flight of
its most profitable business (the healthiest groups)." Id. The company claimed that about
10,000 group policyholders a month were lost as a result of "predatory pricing practices
on the part of commercial carriers." Id. Empire had estimated that splitting the pool
would have increased the cost to bad risk policy holders by 50%, but would have de-
creased the costs to good risks by 50%. See id. Curiale did not believe such a plan made
for good public policy. He wanted to continue risk sharing "instead of dividing the
healthy from the sick." Id.
55. See 1991 ANNuAL REPORT, supra note 54, at 3. The average rate increase was
"14.6% for the New York City Metropolitan area, 10.5% for the Albany area and 5.4% for
the mid-Hudson area." Id.
56. Id.
57. See id.
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"cherry-pick"58 the healthier customers by charging them lower
rates. 59 Empire argued that as a consequence it was left with
the sicker insureds who were causing its reserves to dwindle. 60
Governor Cuomo, in response to the rising costs that were
forcing people to drop coverage, recommended a comprehensive
approach to the problem in 1991. He submitted legislation that
would have required all health insurers to community-rate their
policies for small employers and individuals.6' This plan, dubbed
the Governor's Program Bill, was defeated in committee that
year.
"Empire Blue, with more than seven million subscribers,
has traditionally been known as New York's largest insurer of
last resort. 62 As a result of its status as the insurer of last re-
sort, Empire has been left with "a subscriber pool disproportion-
ately populated by elderly and sick subscribers." 3 This has been
a significant factor in Empire Blue's financial shortcomings and
its need for rate increases. However, this was not the only con-
tributing factor. The company's administrators had a "history of
inattentiveness to Empire's management and operations."" This
mismanagement prompted Superintendent Curiale to contact
Empire's Board of Directors personally and to call on them to
"actively oversee the management and direction of the company
or resign."65
58. See Matthew Schwartz, Empire Blues Sue to Get Rate Hike, NAT'L UNDERWRITER,
LIME & HEALTH, Aug. 10, 1992, at 2 ("John Kelly, a spokesman for Empire Blues, said
that... [Empire] ha[d] lost 485,000 good-risk customers 'to private insurers that con-
tinue to cherry-pick! "); see also 1992 N.Y. SUPERINTENDENT INs. ANN. REP. 8 (1993) [here-
inafter 1992 ANNUAL REPORT].
59. See 1991 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 54, at 3-4; see also Health Insurance Blues
to Solve Empire Blue Cross's Financial Woes, Make All Insurers Abide by the Same
Rules, NEWSDAY, Oct. 5, 1991, at 14 [hereinafter Health Insurance Blues, NEWSDAY].
60. See generally 1991 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 54, at 3-4; Health Insurance
Blues, NEWSDAY, supra note 59.
61. See 1990 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 51, at 3-4 ("Premiums for community-rated
health insurance contracts are based on the claims experience of all subscribers in a
given geographic area, rather than the specified claims experience of one small group or
individual subscriber . . . [whereas] commercial insurers are permitted to pick and
choose the healthiest customers, while Blue Cross/Blue Shield plans take everyone re-
gardless of age, sex, medical condition or occupation.").
62. 1993 N.Y. SUPERINTENDENT INS. ANN. REP. 2 (1994) [hereinafter 1993 ANNUAL
REPORT].
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id.; see infra Parts il..-IV; see also Mary Jane Fisher, High Drama at Senate
Hearing on Empire Blues, NAT'L UNDERWRITER, LIrE & HEALTH, July 12, 1993, at 10 (dis-
cussing staff report of the Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations which re-
vealed, after a six month investigation, that "gross mismanagement wasteful expendi-
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The Blue Cross/Blue Shield Association criticized Empire,
among other Blues, for mismanagement and misuse of funds. 66
To help deal with these troubles the Association took action
which included: "[AInnual reviews of individual plans' compli-
ance with the national association's financial standards; regular
meetings with key local plan managers as well as state regula-
tors; and changes in the makeup of boards of directors."67 The
criticism regarding the need for Empire Blue to reorganize did
not come to New York State's political forefront until 1994. In
order to understand the significance of these changes, one must
first understand how community rating is tied to the problems
of Empire.
In January 1992, Empire requested another rate increase of
up to forty percent for the New York City Metropolitan area.68 It
also requested smaller increases in Albany and the Hudson ar-
eas. These rate increases were to affect the direct-pay, non-
Medicare customers as well as the small group, major-medical
subscribers. Empire initiated the rate request because it was
projecting losses of $372 million for 1992. Its reserve fund had
fallen to $144 million, which is about two percent of its pre-
mium volume.69 The plan's reserves should have been at 7.5% of
the premiums. 70 Officials at the company believed that the
reserves would be depleted by the middle of 1992 if the State
tures, fraud and a history of inattentiveness and non-action by its board of directors and
the State Insurance Department have left it critically ill."). But see 1992 ANNUAL REPORT,
supra note 58, at 2; Empire BC/BS Plan Operations Audited, Bus. INS., May 24, 1993, at
10 (claiming that the community rating law's mandated audit of Empire Blue revealed
that the company's financial troubles, mismanagement and organizational deficiencies
were largely the result of Empire's practice of insuring all risks and the spiraling costs
of health care).
66. See Mark A. Hoflnann, Blues Take 'Step Forward. Senate Hearings End with
Blues Promising Accountability, Bus. INs., Aug. 15, 1994, at 25; see also infra Parts HA1.-
IV (discussing criticisms and changes in Empire Blue).
67. Hofmann, supra note 66, at 25. President and Chief Executive Bernard
Tresnowski of the Blue Cross & Blue Shield Association noted that Empire would be
"stripped of the right to use Blue Cross & Blue Shield in its name if it fails to meet the
national group's standards" Id.; see also Matthew P. Schwartz, Empire Turns to Briggs
To Restore Its Credibility, NATrL UNDERwRrrER, LIFE & HEALTH, July 12, 1993, at 1 (dis-
cussing Empire's hiring of Philip Briggs as its new chairman and interim CEO in wake
of the US. Senate's investigations). Briggs, commenting on the state of Empire, stated,
"MThe place isn't falling apart ... [w]e need to make some organizational changes and fill
some key [management positions] Schwartz, supra.
68. See Empire BC/BS Files for Rate Increase, THE BULLETIN (New York State In-
surance Department), Jan.-Feb. 1992, at 9.
69. See id.
70. See id.
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did not approve an increase.71 Empire requested another in-
crease in March, for downstate individual and small group com-
munity-rated members.7 2 Albert Cardone, the company's chief
executive officer, claimed that the present rate filing was "neces-
sary for Empire 'to simply break even' in the current year and
would have no impact on Empire's depleted surplus condition."73
The company was granted half of the requested rate increase.74
Superintendent Curiale stated that "it was necessary due to
Empire's losses."7 5 Curiale also stated that unless the State Leg-
islature passed new insurance reforms, the remainder of the re-
quest would be granted in October.76 Empire Blue's financial di-
lemma forced the State government to take action.77 In March
1992, Assemblyman Alexander "Pete" Grannis (D-Manhattan),
the Chairman of the Assembly Insurance Committee, revived
Governor Cuomo's community rating bill from 1991 and incorpo-
rated new provisions, "including one that mandated a manage-
71. See id.
72. See Empire BC/BS Granted Partial Rate Increase, THE BULLETIN (New York
State Insurance Department), Mar. 1992, at 1 [hereinafter Partial Rate Increase, THE
BuLLETI] ("Curiale urged enactment of Governor Cuomo's community rating bill, which
would require all health insurers--commercials, HMOs and non-profits-to cover any in-
dividual or small group that applies.").
73. Id. at 2.
74. See Rate Denial Prompts Empire BC/BS Lawsuit, THE BULLETIN (New York
State Insurance Department), Sept.-Oct. 1992, at 1 (explaining that Empire filed suit
against the Department because it would not grant the second half of the proposed 28%
rate increase). Empire also sued because the Department would not approve a three
year plan to restore the company's reserves. See id. Justice Harold Hughes of the New
York State Supreme Court, Albany County, ruled in favor of Empire on Oct. 2, 1992. See
id.
75. Partial Rate Increase, THE BULLETIN, supra note 72, at 1. 'The rate increases af-
fect Empire's 1.2 million individual and small group subscribers ... ! Id. There was to
be a 12.9% increase for the New York City Metro area, 7.6% for Albany and 7.5% in the
Mid-Hudson region. See id. The Insurance Department claimed that commercial insur-
ers' ability to discriminate against high risk groups (for example, elderly and sick peo-
ple) caused Empire to suffer large losses on its individual and small group business. See
id.
76. See id. at 1.
77. See Dena Bunis, Break from High Costs for Now, But State Help for Empire Is
No Guarantee for Future, NEwSDAY, Jan. 12, 1993, at 4 (discussing the plight of New
Yorkers under expensive health coverage from Empire Blue and how it is hoped that
community rating will remedy this problem: "Hugh and Denise Collins already work six
days a week at their Lake Ronkonoma transmission repair shop so they can afford the
$7,000 it costs them for their Empire family policy and the annual $2,000 deductible.
Hugh, a liver transplant recipient, can't get insurance anywhere else."); see also 1992
ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 58, at 8 ("Empire's policyholders, many of whom had no-
where to turn, became hapless victims caught in a health insurance maelstrom."); Par-
tial Rate Increase, THE BULLETIN, supra note 72, at 1 (noting that in September 1992 Su-
perintendent Curiale selected Arthur Anderson & Company to perform the audit).
1998] NEW YORK'S EMPIRE BLUES 479
ment audit of Empire Blue Cross/Blue Shield."78 The bill7 9 re-
ceived Assembly approval on June 30th and the Senate passed
it in July of 1992.80 The bill became chapter 501 of the Laws of
1992 and became effective on April 1, 1993.
The law requires all health insurers who offer individual or
group coverage to sell policies to any applicant regardless of age,
sex, occupation or prior health history.8 ' The rates for this cover-
age are to be community-rated. As a result, an insurer must
base coverage on the entire pool of individual or small group
policyholders in a particular geographic area.8 2 In short, anyone
in New York State can apply for health insurance from a com-
78. 1992 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 58, at 8; see also Partial Rate Increase, TH
BULLETIN, supra note 72, at 1 (discussing Curiale's claim that people had been asking for
reforms of Empire itself). In 1992, there was growing public support for performing an
audit of Empire's management, salaries and other expenses. See Partial Rate Increase,
THE BULLETIN, supra. Superintendent Curiale delivered testimony at public hearings in
New York before the Senate's Standing Committee on Insurance. See id. He urged the
Senate to support the governor's new community rating bill. See id. Curiale claimed that
"[a]s better risks moved to lower-cost alternatives, Empire Blue Cross and Blue Shield
...was badly hurt. While commercial, for-profit carriers were picking and choosing the
healthiest and youngest groups, the worst risks gravitated to or remained with Empire."
Id. The problems that New York is facing with health insurance, according to Curiale,
stem from community rating being forced to compete against experience rating. See id.
The Superintendent contended that the governor's bill, requiring all carriers to commu-
nity-rate, with open enrollment, would be a step towards solving New Yorls health in-
surance crisis. See id.
79. 1992 N.Y. LAws ch. 501 (A. 12350-A) (McKinney).
80. See 1992 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 58, at 3.
81. See 1992 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 58, at 2; see also N.Y. INS. LAw § 3231 (Mc-
Kinney 1996). Prior to the changes brought on by this law, most private insurers used
experience rating, whereas the Blues used community rating. See Ford, supra note 6, at
116-18 (discussing the private sector's traditional approach to the business of health
insurance).
82. See 1992 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 58, at 8; see also N.Y. INS. LAw § 3231(a)
(McKinney 1985 & Supp. 1998).
Any individual and dependents of such individual and any small group [that is,
50 or fewer people), including all employees or group members and dependents
of employees or members, applying for individual health insurance coverage,
including medicare supplemental insurance, must be accepted at all times
throughout the year for any hospital and/or medical coverage offered by the in-
surer to individuals or small groups in the state.., the premium for all per-
sons covered by a policy or contract form is the same based on the experience
of the entire pool of risks covered by that policy or contract form without re-
gard to age, sex, health status or occupation.
N.Y. INS. LAW § 3231(a); see also N.Y. COiP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 11 § 360.5 (1995)
(prohibiting underwriting practices and eligibility rules affecting individual and small
group health insurance). These practices include: lists of occupations, medical tests,
medical examinations, questions about hobbies, doctor statements, investigations into
health status, family health status or sexual orientation. See N.Y. Comp. CODES R. &
REGS. tit. 11 § 360.5.
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pany offering such coverage and they cannot be denied. An in-
surance company must also charge everyone in a specific region
the same price regardless of age, sex or pre-existing condition.83
The passage of this bill made "New York [the] first state in
the nation to provide its residents with health insurance system
in which all who apply must be accepted and offered a rate that
cannot vary because of their age, sex, occupation or medical con-
dition." 84 Governor Cuomo in an Executive Memorandum ex-
pounded on the goals of community rating:
[Community rating] suggests that [New Yorkers] will actually use the
health care system. They can no longer be terminated by an insurer be-
cause they do, in fact, need medical care. They will no longer have to pay
higher rates for health insurance simply because they age or get sick.
And health insurance rates should stabilize over a large pool which will
be better able to absorb the cost. In addition to community rating and
open enrollment for individuals and small group health insurance, the
bill makes other important reforms to the State's system of health insur-
ance. For instance, it requires insurers to credit the time a person was
covered under a prior health insurance package in determining whether
to apply a pre-existing condition limitation. This change, commonly re-
ferred to as portability of health insurance, addresses the problem faced
by those who want to change employment or insurers but are not able to
because they cannot afford to be without coverage for the period that a
new pre-existing condition exclusion would be in effect with a new
insurer.8
Although Governor Cuomo focused on how the law would
help New York State citizens, Empire Blue's financial troubles
were the driving force behind this legislation. In his 1992 An-
nual Report, Superintendent Curiale indicated that prior to
community rating and open enrollment, Empire Blue had been
unable to compete with private insurers who were permitted to
price their insurance according to an individual's or group's
risk.86 This disparity had enabled the commercial insurers to ab-
sorb all of the good risks (that is, healthy people).87 Healthy in-
dividuals could obtain private insurance at prices that were
83. See N.Y. INs. L. § 3231(a); see also N.Y. INs. L. § 3233(3) (providing that commu-
nity rating, "shall include reinsurance or a pooling process involving insurer [and HMO]
contributions to, or receipts from, a fund which shall be designed to share the risk of or
equalize high cost claims.").
84. 1992 N.Y. LAws 2896-97 (Executive Memorandum concerning Governor Cuomo's
approval of the bill L.1992, c. 501).
85. Id.
86. See 1992 ANNuAL REPORT, supra note 58, at 8.
87. See id.
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lower than anything that Empire could offer.88 Curiale con-
tended that this cherry-picking helped send Empire Blue Cross/
Blue Shield into an economic tailspin. 89 As the good risks
flocked to the private market, Empire's rates continued to in-
crease, which in turn prompted more policyholders to leave. This
process resulted in a vicious circle.90 Community rating did not
become fully effective until April 1, 1993. As a result, Empire's
economic difficulties continued.91
It was expected that after community rating took effect that
Empire would gain a foothold in the market due to the legisla-
tively mandated level playing field.92 In December 1992, Empire
requested another rate increase of 26.3%.9s Nearly one and a
half million community-rated subscribers were to be affected.94
The company expected that without the rate increase, its net
would be about $30 million at the end of 1992 (a $114.5 million
decrease from 1991). 95 Albert Cardone claimed that "[community
rating was] doing nothing at this point in time to control the fi-
nancial hemorrhaging of Empire, or stop the upward pressure
on our premiums."96
The State Legislature and Governor Cuomo were able to
mitigate this premium increase with a settlement from a law-
suit initiated by Empire and several other insurers in 1992.
97
88. See id.
89. See id.
90. See id.
91. See id. at 8-9. In the fall of 1992, Empire asked for "a 25.5% weighted average
increase on its community-rated small group and individual contracte Id. The financial
state of Empire was so poor at this time that Superintendent Curiale granted the full
increase. See id.
92. Id. at 9. Community rating was "expected to facilitate access to health insurance
by New York residents. The legislation also promotes competition among insurers on the
bases of efficient claims handling, ability to manage care services, consumer satisfaction,
and low administrative costs rather than on the basis of differing underwriting and rat-
ing practices." Id. Because underwriting was no longer a major contention, Empire was
supposed to be able to capture a fair share of the market. See id.
93. See Empire Requests Another Rate Increase, THE BULLETIN (New York State In-
surance Department), Dec. 1992, at 1.
94. See id.
95. See id.
96. Id. at 2. Richard Kessel, Executive Director of the New York State Consumer
Protection Board, opposed the rate increase. See id. In 1992, the Board reported that the
level of Empire's administrative costs were unreasonably high for a non-profit insurer.
See id. Empire had 66 vice-presidents and assistant vice-presidents. Kessel wanted any
increase postponed until the mandated audit of Empire was completed. See id.
97. See $100 Million Infusion Helps Trim Empire Rate Hikes, THE BUuIr=N (New
York State Insurance Department), Jan.-Feb. 1993, at 2 [hereinafter $100 Million Infu-
sion, THE BULITnu] (explaining that with an average increase of 26%, certain direct pay
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These suits represented an attempt to recover $210 million in
surplus funds from the New York State excess medical malprac-
tice insurers; funds that had been wrongfully moved to the
State's general fund.98 The settlement provided that a one-time
$100 million infusion would be given to Empire in order to en-
sure that its rate increase would not exceed 25%.99 As a result,
the average increase was only 19.5%.100
Curiale stated that the rate increase was essential for Em-
pire's financial solvency. 10' He believed that the steady escala-
tion of health care costs and the increased use of health care
services by those covered under community-rated contracts had
caused the company's woes.10 2 Empire had estimated that at the
end of 1992 it would have a meager surplus of $29.7 million, or
0.4% of its premium income. 10 3 The law, however, required in-
surers to carry $543.4 million.10 4 Empire's community-rated con-
tracts were expected to lose $268 million in 1992.105 The $100
million from the settlement enabled the company to keep its
surplus at just below $100 million and decrease its community-
rated losses to $143.6 million.106 Empire also planned to receive
$130 million from the new insurance pool created by the new
community rating regulations. 107
subscribers would have paid a 59% increase).
98. See id.
Excess medical malpractice insurers participate in a program established in
1985 whereby hospitals pay, at the request of attending physicians, premiums
for a second $1 million/$3 million layer above the standard $1 million/$3 mil-
lion policy that most physicians purchase on their own. Since such expenses
were included by hospitals in calculating their charges, the cost of the excess
program fell on the State's health insurers ....
Id. Under the settlement, the State borrowed $150 million from its surplus and distrib-
uted it among Empire and other BC/BS plans. See id. The state must repay the loan
plus interest if the Medical Malpractice Insurance Association's surplus falls below a
specified level. See id.
99. See id.
100. See id.
101. See id.
102. See id.
103. See id.
104. See id.
105. See id.
106. See id.
107. See Community Rating and Pooling Regulations Proposed, THE BULLETIN (New
York State Insurance Department), Nov. 1992, at 1. This particular article explains that
the pooling mechanism has two elements in the new community rating law: First,
"[m]easurement of distribution of each insurer's business by age and sex categories and
the translation of that measurement into a relative risk factor for each insurer." Id. In-
surers with high risk factor would receive money from the pool while others that have
only average risk factors would contribute to the pool. Second, there will also be "pooling
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In April 1993, community rating took effect in New York.
About forty insurers offered coverage to individuals and there
were more than fifty doing the same in the small group mar-
ket. 08 Curiale expected "more insurers to enter the small group
and individual markets as the benefits of the community rating/
open enrollment approach became more apparent."10 9
Soon after the start of community rating, Arthur Anderson
released its report on Empire Blue.110 The management audit
recommended a "realignment of Empire's management function
to decentralize decision making [in order] to enhance the in-
surer's response to changing market conditions.""' It indicated
that the chief executive officer and chairman of the board should
be replaced." 2 "In addition, the Anderson Report point[ed] to ec-
onomic and market forces beyond Empire's control as the main
reason for the company's financial problems over the past few
years."" 3 It also stated that the new community rating law "was
critical to addressing... the major problem confronting Empire,
[the uneven playing field that made it] the insurer of last resort
"114
of large claims which helps protect insurers from the adverse financial effects of incur-
ring a disproportionate number of such claims." Id. Each insurer is to contribute a pre-
determined percentage of its premiums. See id. The money will be distributed in propor-
tion to the amount of large claims under a company's control. See id.; see also Dena
Bunis, Insurance Law Battle; HMOs Sue State Over Bill that Will Aid Blue Cross, NEWS-
DAY, Mar. 11, 1993, at 45 (discussing HMO suit which claimed "the pooling provision vio-
lates the federal Employee Retirement Income Security Act, which prohibits using em-
ployee benefits to subsidize other plans."); New York State Conference of Blue Cross &
Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Ins. Co., 514 U.S. 645 (1995) (finding in favor of Empire
Blue and New York State).
108. See Community Rating Off to Strong Start, THE BULLETIN (New York State In-
surance Department), Apr. 1993, at 1 [hereinafter Strong Start, THE BULLETIN]. But see
Matthew Schwartz, NY Law Generates Big Rate Increases, NAV'L UNDERWRITER, Lin &
HEALTH, Apr. 12, 1993, at 2 [hereinafter Schwartz, Big Rate Increases]; Matthew
Schwartz, More Cos. Leaving Small Group, Individual Markets in New York, NAT'L UN-
DERWRrER, LIFE & HEALTH, Feb. 22, 1993, at 6 [hereinafter Schwartz, More Cos. Leaving]
(indicating that the industry claims only three insurers offer coverage to individuals and
fourteen offer coverage to groups).
109. Strong Start, THE BuLmETIN, supra note 108, at 1.
110. See Empire BCIBS Management Audit Completed, THE BULLETIN (New York
State Insurance Department), May 1993, at 2 [hereinafter Audit Completed, THE BULLE-
TIN) (noting that Arthur Anderson consulting firm was awarded contract to audit Empire
Blue, and that the audit was mandated by the new community rating law); see infra
notes 143-58 and accompanying text (discussing audit).
111. Audit Completed, THE BULLETIN, supra note 110, at 1.
112. See id.
113. Id.
114. Id.
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The report noted that Empire's management was not as
flexible as that of its for-profit competitors because Empire was
moving from a non-profit business model to a "hybrid" business
model-a change that would allow Empire to compete with com-
mercial insurers for large group, for-profit business.115 "Empire's
social mission is in conflict with 'modem reality' of rising health
care costs and competitive market forces [and] this is the main
reason for [its] current financial difficulties."" 6 The audit con-
cluded that Empire needed to change its business practices." 7
The report explored the public criticisms facing Empire and
claimed that: (1) administrative costs were not the cause of the
company's rising premiums, (2) experience-rated business was
not a financial drain, (3) the number of officers and their levels
of compensation were reasonable, and (4) travel expenses and
entertainment were reasonable." 8 The audit offered two final
suggestions: first, that Empire's tax and financial preferences be
removed in fairness to other insurers; second, that the State re-
quire all insurers in New York to underwrite both large and
small markets. This report verified Empire's and the Insurance
Department's claims that commercial cherry-picking was the
primary cause of the company's financial woes. It also supported
the actions taken by the State in implementing community rat-
ing to level the industry playing field. According to Arthur An-
derson, Empire and New York were moving in the proper direc-
tion to reform the health insurance market.
III. REACTION TO NEW YORK's COMMUNITY RATING REFORM
The insurance industry in New York State resisted commu-
nity rating. The New York State Association of Life Underwrit-
ers (NYSALU) felt that Governor Cuomo "uncritically ... swal-
lowed the well publicized claims of Empire that commercial
insurers should somehow pay for cherry-picking Empire's good
risks."" 9 The NYSALU admitted that Empire lost a significant
share of the small group market between 1988 and 1992.120 This
115. See id.
116. Id.
117. See id.
118. See id.
119. Memorandum in Opposition to Sections 39-43 of A. 8929 by Ways and Means
from Benjamin Y. Brewster, Jr., Director of Government Affairs, New York Association of
Life Underwriters, Inc. (Dec. 1991) (on file with Buffalo Law Review).
120. Memorandum In Opposition To Sections 64-68 & 93-99 of A. 9306, S. 6806
Budget Bill from Benjamin Y. Brewster, Jr., Director of Government Affairs, New York
Association of Life Underwriters, Inc. (Mar. 10, 1992) (on file with Buffalo Law Review).
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loss totaled about 400,000 insureds. It denied, however that pri-
vate insurers lured these policyholders away. Commercial insur-
ers reportedly only insured about 300,000 people in the small
group market and more recent figures did not indicate a signifi-
cant change in those numbers. 121
The NYSALU claimed that Empire had in fact shown a con-
sistent gain in its community-rated business and that Empire's
HMO and experience-rated business were the true sources of its
losses.122 Cherry-picking, according to the NYSALU, was not
Empire's problem. The NYSALU urged that community rating
be struck from the Budget Bill. The industry resented the ad-
vantages that Blue Cross/Blue Shield insurers already held in
New York. 23 It believed that "community rating as proposed in
this bill would further tilt the playing field in favor of the Blues
which are regionally organized with an already dominant mar-
ket share." 24 The industry predicted that the advantages of Em-
pire would force many commercial insurers to withdraw from
the market.125 The NYSALU also claimed that the "pure" com-
munity rating prescribed by this law would force young and
healthy insureds to forego health coverage because of the rise in
costs from being pooled with higher risks. All policyholders
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Blue Cross/Blue Shield insurers already enjoy a 13% hospital discount advan-
tage over their commercial competitors; they are also exempt from premium and
franchise tax. See Memorandum in Opposition to Sections 64-68 & 93-99 of A. 9306, S.
6806 Budget Bill from Benjamin Y. Brewster, Jr., Director of Government Affairs, New
York Association of Life Underwriters, Inc. (Mar. 12, 1992) (on file with Buffalo Law
Review).
124. Memorandum in Opposition to Sections 64-68 & 93-99 of A. 9306, S. 6806
Budget Bill from Benjamin Y. Brewster, Jr., Director of Government Affairs, New York
Association of Life Underwriters, Inc. (Mar. 11, 1992) (on file with Buffalo Law Review);
cf New York State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Insurance
Company, 514 U.S. 645 (1995). In Travelers, the insurance industry tried to level the
playing field by filing suit against State officials. 514 U.S. at 651-52. New York had
passed a law requiring hospitals to collect surcharges from patients covered by a com-
mercial carrier, but not from patients insured by a Blue Cross/Blue Shield plan. See id.
at 649-50. The New York law also subjected certain HMOs to surcharges. See id. Private
Insurers claimed that § 514(a) of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974
(ERISA) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a)) pre-empted surcharges on patients'
bills whose commercial coverage was purchased by an ERISA plan, and also pre-empted
surcharges on HMOs insofar as their membership fees were paid by an ERISA plan. See
id. at 651-52. The Court held that New York's surcharge provisions did not "relate to"
employee benefit plans within the meaning of § 514(a) and that as a result, ERISA did
not pre-empt the surcharges. See id. at 667.
125. See Memorandum in Opposition to Sections 64-68 & 93-99 of A. 9306, S. 6806
Budget Bill from Benjamin Y. Brewster, Jr., Director of Government Affairs, New York
Association of Life Underwriters, Inc. (Mar. 11, 1992) (on file with Buffalo Law Review).
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under the new law would be paying the same premium rate,
which would be higher for the young when compared with their
rates prior to the law.126 Industry leaders felt that the Legisla-
ture had become hostage to Empire and that community rating
would not benefit New York as promised. 127
Commercial carriers' fears were not unfounded. Several pri-
vate insurers withdrew from the individual and small group
markets rather than community-rate their policies. "[O]nly three
private insurers who sell individual health insurance remain in
New York. They are: International Life Investors Ins. Co., Mu-
tual of Omaha, and Nation Wide Life. Fourteen commercial in-
surers remain in the small group market."128
The law also caused health insurance rates to increase "an
average of nineteen percent in the small group market and eigh-
teen percent for individuals."12 9 The average young male exper-
ienced a startling increase of 170%. "[T]he price of a standard
126. See Memorandum: Current Legislative Concerns of the New York State Associ-
ation of Life Underwriters, from Benjamin Y. Brewster, Jr., Director of Government Af-
fairs, N.Y. Ass'n of Life Underwriters, Inc. (1996) (on file with Buffalo Law Review).
Empire BCIBS reports the average age of its direct pay insureds has been con-
sistently increasing and is now in the 50s, and Mutual of Omaha found that in
the first 18 months under community rating the average age of both its indi-
vidual and small group business increased by five years.
Id.
127. See Barbara Forster, Community Rating: Do Not Resuscitate?, CENTRAL N.Y.
Bus. JouR, July 27, 1992, § 1. In this article, the author quotes Emily Crandall, Vice
President and Associate General Counsel to The Guardian, who claimed that "[sixty
percent of our younger policy-holders will see rate increases. Furthermore, those with
younger employees making less money will drop out and take a chance on getting sick."
Id. Roseanne Hennessey, spokesperson for The Travelers Company in Hartford, Connect-
icut, "feels that community rating defeats the concept of managed care. 'There is no fi-
nancial incentive to keep costs down if a company is grouped with employers who
don't.'" Id.
128. David Bauder, New Health Insurance Rules Take Effect, BuFFALo NEws, Apr. 1,
1993, at A9 ("Nine companies already have abandoned the state and sent notices to
about 50,000 people that their health insurance coverage would be dropped today."); see
also Schwartz, Big Rate Increases, supra note 108, at 2. Mr. Schwartz has reported on
the continuing exodus of private insurers from New York's small group and individual
markets. See Schwartz, More Cos. Leaving, supra note 108, at 6. The author notes that
seven more companies pulled out of New York State: State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins.
Co.; Massachusetts Mutual Life; ITT Corp's Hartford Life unit; Liberty Mutual; Cigna
Corp's INA Life Ins. Co. of New York; Nation Wide Ins. Co. and Equitable Cos. Id.
129. Schwartz, Big Rate Increases, supra note 108, at 2. According to Karen Olson,
President of Benefits Design Group (an insurance brokerage house that serves the small
group market), rates have increased primarily for the young and healthy. See id. "'We're
concerned that the individuals [in New York] will drop their coverage because their rates
are too high, thus increasing the uninsured population in New York,' said Chris Peter-
son, assistant general counsel for the Health Insurance Association of America." Id.
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fee-for-service plan escalated from $1,200 to $3,240" for a thirty
year-old male.130 These price increases caused a significant num-
ber of people to go bare. According to a study conducted by Mil-
liman and Robertson, Inc., a New York actuarial firm, "individ-
ual coverage in New York fell from 1.2 million on March 1,
1993, to less than 500,000 on January 1, 1994."131 However, New
York's Department of Insurance severely criticized this report.
32
The Department released its own figures which indicated that
"1.2%, or 25,477, fewer people were insured in the individual
and small groups markets as of Jan. 1, 1994, nine months after
the community rating and open enrollment law went into ef-
fect."133 The individual market decline of 12.4% was more severe,
as it left 43,666 fewer individuals insured.13 4
130. Carol Goldberg, Generation Gap in Community Rating, L.I. Bus. NEws, Aug. 29,
1994, § 1, at 1 (according to a Washington Post report (July,17, 1994), New York's com-
munity rating law will cost people under the age of 35 at least $40 billion yearly to sub-
sidize individuals between ages 45 and 64). "If each single person, regardless of age,
pays the same $2,000 premium per year, the 25-year old pays 100% more, losing $1,000
a year, while the 60-year old pays 40% less and gains $1,500 a year." Id. The sponsor of
the community rating law, Assemblyman Peter Grannis when asked about the report,
replied, "I seriously question the validity of those numbers." Id.
But, Charles Eggleton, vice president, Delphi Insurance Brokerage (Kings
Park) says, "I do a fair amount of group health business and I agree with the
report. When the law became effective, the rates on my oldest clientele fell
somewhat, but the rates on young people climbed precipitously. It's fair to say
that most of this has been on the backs of the young single workers. What is
happening is that a number of young people are simply opting out of the insur-
ance market and going uncovered."
Id.
131. Curiale Blasts Milliman and Robertson Study, BEST WMNE, Sept. 15, 1994, at 1,
available in LEXIS, News Library, Wires File. New York Insurance Superintendent, Sal-
vatore Curiale "asserted that the decline suggested by the report is incorrect because the
report inappropriately compared pre-reform Census Bureau reports, which represented
people covered by both group and individual policies, to post-reform figures that only
represented people covered by individual policies." Id. He also criticized Milliman and
Robertson for not revealing that the report was funded by "certain commercial insurance
companies and others opposed to health care reform efforts." Id.
132. See id.
133. Matthew Schwartz, Sparks Flying Over NY's Community Rating Law, NATL
UNDERWRITER, LFE & HEALTH, June 6, 1994, at 66 ("At Mutual of Omaha, 58% of those
who let their coverage lapse did so because of cost .... Among those without coverage,
51% were between the ages of 26 and 35 and 21% between the ages 36 and 45."). Be-
tween April and November 1993, "the number of individual policies written by Mutual of
Omaha dropped by more than 30%." Id. "Premiums rose for approximately 60% of indi-
vidually insured persons, while 30% experienced premium increases of more than 20%."
Id. But see Census Report: NYS Uninsured Rate Unchanged, THE BULLETIN (New York
State Insurance Department), Sept.-Oct. 1994, at 1 (State refers to federal survey to
support community rating success).
134. See id.
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A. The US. Senate Looks into Empire's Problems
In June of 1993, the United States Senate Subcommittee on
Investigations, a permanent subcommittee of the Committee on
Governmental Affairs, decided to examine the plight of Empire
Blue.135 After a six month investigation, the Subcommittee's in-
vestigative staff testified to the following problems with the
management, operations and regulations of the Empire Plan:
an inability to properly execute the most basic function of an insurance
company, resulting in abysmally poor service to subscribers and provid-
ers; a severe lack of internal controls, leading to a high degree of vulner-
ability to fraud; excessive expenditures of the benefit of senior officers
and members of the board of directors; a propensity on the part of the
plan Management to blame external factors for the plan's failings and to
rely upon external sources of relief to keep it afloat; inadequate oversight
of management activities by the board of directors and ineffective regula-
tion of the plan by the State Department of Insurance.136
The Subcommittee staff claimed that Empire's senior of-
ficers and board of directors, along with the State Department
of Insurance were in a "state of self-delusion and denial."'37 Ac-
cording to the Subcommittee investigation, Empire refused to
accept that the plan's mismanagement had caused the current
crisis.138 The Subcommittee went on to report that these three
groups "place[d] nearly all of the blame for the plan's financial
predicament on external sources, such as the economy, inflation,
unfair competition, and commercial insurers." 39
Empire and the Insurance Department have consistently
placed the blame for the plan's financial losses on cherry-
picking. The investigative reports, however, revealed that "Em-
pire's own small-group cancellation study, dated January of
135. See Oversight of the Insurance Industry: Blue Cross/Blue Shield-Empire Plan
(New York): Hearings Before the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations of the Com-
mittee on Governmental Affairs United States Senate, 103d Cong. 1 (1993) [hereinafter
Oversight Hearing] (opening statement of Chairman Sam Nunn). This investigation was
initiated after the failure of Blue Cross and Blue Shield of West Virginia. See id. "In
1990, that plan became the first, and so far the only, Blue Cross plan to fail. As a result
of that failure, over 51,000 individuals were left with outstanding unpaid medical
claims Id. The Subcommittee discovered that the West Virginia plan failed because of
"waste and mismanagement.. . combined with inadequate oversight of the plan on the
part of the board of directors, the State Insurance Department, and the National Blue
Cross and Blue Shield Association." Id.
136. Id. at 5 (testimony of John F. Sopko, Deputy Chief Counsel).
137. Id. at 6.
138. See id.
139. Id.
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1992, using data provided by the Gallup company, show[ed] that
less than half of those groups that canceled the Empire coverage
in 1991 went to commercial carriers" 140 In a separate Gallup re-
port, taken in February 1992, thirty-six percent of the policy-
holders that canceled their Empire coverage did not purchase
insurance from another company.41
The Subcommittee seriously criticized the Arthur Andersen
report. 42 New York State had both commissioned and paid for
this audit.' 43 Throughout the Subcommittee's investigation, Em-
pire and the New York Insurance Department had contended
that the Arthur Andersen report would support Empire's posi-
tion.'4 The Subcommittee staff, however, "believe[d] the report
may be fatally flawed and question[ed] [its] overall objectivity
... the thoroughness of the Insurance Department's contracting
process for the Arthur Andersen contract; the accuracy, com-
pleteness, and independence of the report; and the undue reli-
ance upon representations of the plan without any independent
verificationf'45
The New York legislature placed only one restriction on the
Insurance Department's authority to grant the audit contract:
The Department could not appoint any organization that had
done work for Empire in the last five years, unless the Depart-
ment could demonstrate the organization's independence and ob-
jectivity. 46 The Subcommittee staff discovered that Arthur An-
dersen had consulting contracts with Empire in 1991 for
$447,000 and in 1992 for $371,000.147 "The size of those con-
tracts made Arthur Andersen one of the highest-paid consul-
tants listed on documents submitted by the plan to the Insur-
ance Department."148
Arthur Andersen offered a professional assurance that the
firm's interest in its contracts would not compromise the legiti-
macy of its work, and indicated that this assurance should be
enough to end any speculation to that effect. 149 It also provided
the audit to the Insurance Department at a discounted rate. 50
140. Id. at 11.
141. See id.
142. See id. at 11-13.
143. See id. at 11 (noting that the audit cost New York $1.9 million).
144. See id.
145. Id. at 11-12.
146. See id. at 12.
147. See id.
148. Id.
149. See id.
150. See id.
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When asked why Arthur Andersen had wanted the contract for
the auditing of Empire, the firm explained "'to be helpful, im-
prove our credentials, and to also get more business from the
Blues!'"151 The Insurance Department did nothing to assure An-
dersen's independence or competency.152 Arthur Andersen con-
ducted its investigation in an unprofessional manner. It never
questioned any of the information that Empire provided. 153 The
firm also failed to conduct any independent interviews of na-
tional accounts, subscribers or former board members. 5 4 Most
importantly, Andersen never reviewed the National Blue Cross/
Blue Shield documents, nor did it verify the cherry-picking ar-
gument.155 Arthur Andersen's audit consisted of a report that
merely repeated the assertions and arguments of Empire. 56 It
did nothing to reveal the mismanagement of Empire. The report
acted as a "bone to be thrown to the State legislature and the
New York Times to make them go away."157
In brief, the Subcommittee staff found that Empire was
mismanaged. "[The] plan appeared incapable of effectively carry-
ing out the most basic functions of an insurer. They couldn't
price, they couldn't collect, they couldn't pay. They couldn't ade-
quately collect their premiums, and they couldn't efficiently and
timely pay their claims." 58 As a result, Empire was unable to
compete or provide adequate service. 59
151. Id. at 12.
152. See id.
153. See id. at 13.
154. See id. at 13-14. National accounts are large accounts with corporations like
IBM, CBS, AT&T and the accounting firm, Deloitte and Touche. See id. at 14.
155. See id. at 14-15.
156. See id. at 15.
157. Id. at 16 (quoting a former vice president of Empire).
158. Id. at 17; see also id. at 141-431 (staff statement providing detailed analysis of
Empire Blue, used as basis for staff testimony during hearing).
159. See id. at 18-20. Approximately 4,200 complaints were received from subscrib-
ers with individual direct pay policies. See id. at 18. Thousands of complaints were re-
ceived from hospitals and employees of Empire's large national accounts. See id. at 18-
19. Hospital administrators constantly complained that Empire "loses claims or denies
ever receiving them." Id. at 18.
One hospital administrator told the staff that his sister submitted a claim to
Empire for $2,600 and received four checks, each for $2,600. She called Empire
Customer Service to explain the mistake and was told it "was her lucky day"
and to just keep the checks. Uncomfortable with this, the woman actually took
the checks to Empire's offices and attempted to return them to the customer
service representatives. She was told the system couldn't handle returned
checks and that she should just keep them.
Id. Hospital administrators do not believe that people are leaving Empire because of
cherry-picking, they claim it is because of the poor service. See id. Empire, in 1992, "re-
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The Subcommittee staff also revealed that the plan's officers
were paid exorbitant salaries for a company that was not finan-
cially sound.160 In addition to overcompensation, the staff found
that Empire's CEOs spent outlandish amounts of money on en-
tertainment and perks.16' Empire has also admitted that fraud
resulted in over $64.5 million in losses in 1991 and 1992
alone.162
Superintendent Curiale offered his testimony in support of
Empire.163 He contended that although Empire was having its
difficulties, the new reform in New York's health insurance law
would help the company to rebound.1' He agreed with the Sub-
committee staff that there had been mismanagement problems,
but he disagreed with the staff's contention that mismanage-
ment was the root of Empire's financial deterioration. 6 5
Mr. Curiale, on behalf of the State Insurance Department,
claimed that Empire was having difficulty because the state's
health insurance system was in need of reform due to the dras-
ceived over five million complaints and telephone inquiries... directly from subscribers
and over 13,000 [of these] complaints ... had been forwarded to the plan from outside
agencies, such as the Office of Consumer Affairs and U.S. Senate Offices. . . " Id.
In 1991, one subscriber actually had to sell her home to pay $20,000 in medi-
cal bills for her father-in-law, which should have been paid by Empire. After
the father-in-law died in 1987, Empire made several payments to the hospital
but failed to pay an outstanding hospital bill of $20,000 until February 1991.
By that time, the hospital had received a judgment against the woman and her
husband who sold their home to pay the bill. When Empire eventually reim-
bursdd the couple, they included a letter apologizing for "taking so long to re-
solve this issue, particularly since it was Empire's error in the first place."
Id. at 19.
160. See id. at 21, 218, 219. Empire has 65 executives overall. See id. at 21. CEO Al
Cardone received $600,000 in 1991. See id. at 218. Despite Empire's continued poor per-
formance, its executives were granted incentive bonuses that increased each year. See id.
161. See id. at 22-25 ("Empire operates as if it is a profitable Fortune 500 company
rather than a non-profit health insurer). The company purchased 82 automobiles for its
executives for a total cost of $1 million. See id. at 23. Empire also owns 41 pool cars. See
id. at 22. In 1992, the plan spent $50,000 on limousines. See id. at 23. In 1991 it spent
$91,000 on limousines. See id. Company gifts to employees cost subscribers $1 million
over the past 5 years. See id. at 24. For $20,000, 12 of Empire's officers attended a semi-
nar in Orlando, Florida entitled "The Disney Approach to Quality Service" See id. at 25.
162. See id. at 30-31.
163. See id. at 127 (testimony of Salvatore R. Curiale, Superintendent of Insurance,
State of New York). Superintendent Curiale delivered a prepared statement after giving
his testimony. See id. at 268.
164. See id. (responding to the subcommittee's inquiry as to whether Empire is too
big to fail, Curiale stated, "Under the laws that existed in New York prior to April 1,
1993, the effective date of health insurance reform legislation, I would agree, Empire
was too big to fail.").
165. See id. at 127.
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tic market changes over the past ten years. 166 Despite the staff
findings, he still maintained that Empire was suffering because
it was the insurer of last resort.167 Mr. Curiale again asserted
that Empire's difficulties resulted from the fact that commercial
insurers cherry-picked their customers. 168 He stated that the pol-
icyholders who complained about Empire's rising rates also com-
plained that they had nowhere else to turn for coverage. 69
The Superintendent continued to testify that the company's
problems had been exacerbated by the plan's commitment to
community rating and open enrollment of individuals, whereas
other companies were able to use experience rating to turn away
poor risks.170 Mr. Curiale contended that the most promising so-
lution to Empire Blue's problems was to spread the insurance
risks to all carriers.' 7' This spreading, he reasoned, would be
possible under the new community rating law. Under this law,
the Insurance Department believed that Empire was "'no longer
too big to fail.' In the event Empire ha[d] to fold, the remaining
insurers and plans would, over a relatively brief time period, ab-
sorb Empire's business." 172 Community rating, according to Su-
perintendent Curiale and the Department, would be the safety
net for New York and its citizens. 73
IV. COMPARING CommuNITY RATING PLANS
In 1993, the Department of Insurance claimed that its com-
munity rating plan was off to a strong start.74 It battled the in-
surance lobby and implemented this plan in an effort to prevent
people from dropping coverage. 75 The new reform law was the
166. See id.
167. See id. at 127-28.
168. See id. at 128-30.
169. See id. at 130. In relevant part, Curiale discussed the cherry-picking argument
from the Empire rate-hike hearings:
They come in, individuals who buy their insurance directly, but lots of small
groups, small groups that are small employers who come in and complain bit-
terly about the high rates that Empire is charging, but on the other hand say,
I have got nowhere else to go. Why? No one else will take me.
Id.
170. See id. at 131.
171. See id. at 135-36.
172. Id. at 379.
173. See id. at 383-84; see also Legislature Passes Historic Community-Rating Bill,
THE BUuTIN (New York State Insurance Department), July 1992, at 1.
174. See Community Rating Off to Strong Start, THE BULLETIN (New York State In-
surance Department), Apr. 1993, at 1.
175. See Oversight Hearing, supra note 135, at 131; see also Superintendent Testifies
Before NYS Senate, THE BULLEIN (New York State Insurance Department), Apr. 1992,
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State's attempt at "bringing people into the system and doing a
better job of managing their care and protecting them from the
instability that results from widely fluctuating premium rate in-
creases." 176 A comparative study with four other states with sim-
ilar community rating plans, however, revealed that New York's
health insurance reform was failing.177 The community rating
plan enacted in New Jersey resulted in twenty new carriers and
eleven thousand previously uninsured people entering the mar-
ket. Vermont, too, has seen success. Small group coverage in-
creased by fifteen percent in the first year of that state's new
law. Although the plans in Massachusetts and Maine have not
been in existence long enough to allow for solid data collection,
preliminary evidence as well as reports from state insurance
regulators seem to indicate that there have been no major
problems. 78
The overall findings of the Special Report are mixed. More
states have reported favorable rather than unfavorable results.
"As predicted, there are anecdotal reports of improved availabil-
ity among firms that have previously had difficulty obtaining
coverage, offset by complaints from firms with relatively young
and healthy workers." 7 9 New Jersey has seen the greatest ini-
tial success with community rating. Insurance Department data
indicated that twenty to twenty-five percent of the people
purchasing new community-rated individual coverage reported
that this is their first time with coverage. 80 The structuring of
at 3 [hereinafter Superintendent Testifies, THE BuLLETI] (testimony offered to evaluate
Governor Cuomo's community-rating and open enrollment bill).
176. Superintendent Testifies, THE BULLETIN, supra note 175, at 4.
177. See KALA E. LADENHEmI AND ANNE R. MARKUS, THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL HEALTH
POLICY PROJECT, THE GEORGE WASHINGTON UNIVRSITY, SPECIAL REPORT, CoMMUNITY RAT-
ING: STATES' EXPERIENCE 1 (July 1994) [hereinafter SPECIAL REPORT] (on file with Buffalo
Law Review). Nineteen states have enacted community rating laws. See id. "Five
states-Vermont (enacted 1991, 1992), Massachusetts (1992), New York (1992), New
Jersey (1992, 1994) and Maine (1992) have had laws in place and implemented long
enough for some preliminary data on the impact of these changes to be available Id.
(emphasis omitted). New York's policy change saw a drop in coverage for individuals. See
id.
178. See id.
179. Id. at 7.
180. See id.; see also id. at Table A-3. The report contains a survey of The New
Jersey Plan. The following data was extracted directly from that survey:
Features
For small groups (2-49), age (5-year intervals), gender, geography (6 ar-
eas). Effective on renewal dates. There are no adjustments for individuals. Full
community rating for new policies as of August 1, 1993; a phase-in for old poli-
cies; and full community rating for all after July 1, 1995.
Carriers
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the individual market was the principal reason that New Jersey
achieved high enrollment. First, new individual policies were
immediately community-rated. Second, renewed policy premi-
ums were phased into these rates over a two year period (1993-
1995).181 Finally, "[t]he law also require[d] all carriers to subsi-
dize the losses of insurers offering nongroup plans, unless they
themselves enroll a specified share of the nongroup market in
their standardized plans."182 This policy resulted in twenty-one
new carriers entering the individual market and eleven thou-
sand previously uninsured people receiving coverage. 183
The positive results for Vermont include a fifteen percent
increase in small group coverage during the first year of its
modified community rating.'8 Individual community rating was
phased in the following year. Initially, some carriers that had a
small percentage of the market withdrew when the law was
Twenty-two carriers in the individual market now (as opposed to one BC/
BS virtually cornering the market). This is due to "insurer play or pay" risk
adjustment based on all insurance business.
Coverage
Over 60,000 persons are now covered under the new individual policies. An
estimated 11,000 (22%) are newly covered individuals.
See id.
181. See id.
182. Id. at 7. The Insurance Department set the initial shares of the nongroup mar-
ket for each carrier, based on previous history. Id. The plan is described as "play or pay."
Id. "If you play and meet your market share, you're exempt from the assessment." Id.
(quoting Robert Vehec, managing actuary in New York State Insurance Department).
183. See id.
184. See id. at 1. Modified community rating is defined as a plan which prohibits
the use of health status claims experience and duration in setting rates and either speci-
fies a limited number of permitted rating factors or defines a process for approval of rat-
ing factors. See id. at 2; see also id. at 8 & Table A-5. The report contains a survey of
the Vermont Plan. The following data was extracted directly from that survey:
Features
The Vermont Commissioner sets allowable factors. The Commissioner also
sets the demographic factors, industry, and geography; no health or experience;
effective July 1, 1992 for group size 1-49 people and effective July 1, 1993 for
individuals.
Carriers
There were 11 small group carriers as of July 8, 1992. As of Aug. 8, 1994,
there were 16 registered carriers selling small group policies and eight regis-
tered carriers selling nongroup coverage in Vermont. A June 1994 study by
William M. Mercer, Inc. found that while some carriers pulled out in response
to the legislation, some new carriers entered and the exiting companies has
relatively little business in Vermont.
Coverage
There were 44,105 covered lives in small group plans as of year end 1992.
This number grew to 50,768 by year end 1993, an increase of 6,663 or 15%.
See id.
1998] NEW YORK'S EMPIRE BLUES 495
passed. Several new companies, however, have entered the mar-
ket and are actively seeking subscribers.185 The law has greatly
expanded coverage with only a small overall cost increase; an
increase countered by stabilized premiums. 8 6 As insurers be-
come comfortable with the new law, increased affordability
should follow. 187
Maine has witnessed both rate increases and decreases.
188
Unlike New York, Maine used a rolling start-up date based on
policy renewal dates.18 9 The greatest increase, however, was for
a carrier that implemented full community rating at once,
rather than phasing it in according to Maine's enacted sched-
ule.190 Three insurers with only six percent of the market left
the state, but no major providers left. 191 Small businesses are
pleased with the plan. Some owners have commented that the
new law has provided an increase in carrier options without a
hike in rates. They are happy that they no longer have to resort
to Blue Cross/Blue Shield. 192
Massachusetts has been phasing in a complex multi-tiered
modified community rating since 1992.193 There have been no re-
185. See id. at 8.
186. See id.
187. See id.
188. See id. at 10 & Table A-1. The report contains a survey of the Maine Plan. The
following data was extracted from that survey:
Features
Age, gender, occupation/industry, geographic area, smoking. Effective after
7/15/93 for small groups. Individuals added 12/1/93.
Carriers
20 carriers in the small group market; no major carrier left. Blue Cross
has 65.9% of the market. Seven carriers in the individual market. Golden Rule
(3.6%) of the market, American Republic (2.3%), State Farm (0.3%), and Blue
Cross (75.5%). Blue Cross has lost some market share in the small group mar-
ket to U.S. Life based on rates and anecdotal reports.
Coverage
A base line survey was conducted prior to the starting date. A second sur-
vey was done in summer 1993, but there have been computer problems with
the data, and the material was gathered before the plan had begun for most
participants. A third one may be conducted in 1993 and should provide a pic-
ture after a full year of participation.
See id.
189. See id. at 10.
190. See id.
191. See id.
192. See id. at 11.
193. See id. & Table A-2. The report includes a survey of the Massachusetts Plan.
The following data was taken from that survey:
Features
Age, sex, industry, participation rate and group size, geographic area, well-
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ports concerning changes in carriers or coverage. Businesses
that had been denied under the old system are now able to ob-
tain coverage, but younger businesses are complaining that
rates are increasing.194 Managed care has expanded significantly
following the law, but it already had held a large share of the
market.195 These rating limits are beneficial to HMOs because
they do more risk management than underwriting.196
New York's experience with community rating has not been
as positive as the other states. 97 "In the first nine months
[March 31, 1993-January 1, 1994] overall coverage in the af-
fected markets-individual, small group and Medicare supple-
mental-declined by 1.2%."198
The New York law appears to have affected the individual
market the most. Companies that continued to offer coverage to
ness. Effective Apr. 1, 1993.
Carriers
No estimates, but the legislation had insurer support because it was
incremental.
Coverage
No information provided.
See id.
194. See id. at 11.
195. See id.
196. See id.
197. See id. at 11 & Table A-4. The report contains a survey of the New York Plan.
The following data was gleaned from that survey:
Features
Geographic region, individual versus family, individual versus small group.
Began on Apr. 1, 1993 for individual and small groups (up to 50 people).
Carriers
There was no substantial change in the small group market. Two carriers,
Preferred life and Prudential, terminated indemnity policies but offered man-
aged care policies in their place. Another five carriers withdrew, with 22,914 or
roughly six percent of the commercial market or less than two percent of the
total market for these categories. The remaining commercial carriers are Mu-
tual of Omaha, National Casualty, and International Life Investor in addition
to the non-profits and HMOs. The Commercial market share rose by .5% and
HMOs gained 5.5%, while the non-profits' share dropped 6%.
Coverage
State wide, coverage dropped from Mar. 31, 1993 to Jan. 1, 1994 by 1.2%
(25,477) among individual, small group and Medicare supplemental policies.
The greatest drop (12%) in coverage occurred in the individual market while
total coverage increased very slightly for small group and medicare supplemen-
tal policies. Non-profits (Blues) lost subscribers in all three categories, commer-
cials lost individual subscribers, and HMOs were big gainers overall.
See id.
198. Id. at 8. This percentage is better understood when compared to the year pre-
ceding the start of community rating. At that time, total coverage in New York also fell
1.2% in the overall population. See id. at 8-9.
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individuals, like Mutual of Omaha, experienced a significant
drop in individual policies from April to November 1993.199 The
Department of Insurance contends that some of the change "was
due to movement among different types of plans and points to
an increase in coverage among older workers and group plans
during the same period."200 The limited availability of 1994 data
concerning the state population as a whole made it difficult to
pinpoint whether the law was failing or if it was merely being
distorted by insureds moving between coverage. 201 What is clear,
however, is that "[i]nsurance coverage among groups affected by
the new law did decline, with a 12.3% decline in the individual
market between 3/31/93 and 1/1/94."202
The available data has allowed researchers to determine
some of the changes which most likely occurred as a result of
New York's community rating law. High risk individuals who
could not afford coverage could now obtain health insurance.203
People who were in a low risk pool, who either experienced a
rate increase or whose carrier fled the market, may have chosen
to go bare or move to a spouse's large group insurance plan.2 0 4
Small group coverage became available to employers who previ-
ously could only find insurance for its employees in the individ-
ual market.20 5 Young and healthy workers, in order to avoid the
rate increases caused by community rating, purchased plans
with higher deductibles. 20 6 Finally, small businesses with a
young and healthy work force began aggressively looking for
ways to self-insure as rates rose under community rating.20 7
199. See id. at 9. Mutual of Omaha experienced a 30% drop in individual coverage.
More than half of those who left were under age 35. See id.
200. Id. ("Some of the decline may reflect a loss of market share to HMOs, which
generally offer lower premiums."). Under the law, IMOs and other managed care plans
are also required to offer open enrollment with community-rated premiums. See id.
201. See id.
202. Id. The extent to which this decline has been caused by community rating is a
disputed issue between the industry and the State Insurance Department. Id. at 8-9.
"The greatest drop (-16.58%) was in coverage in Blue Cross/Blue Shield plans, which
were already community rated before the law." Id. at 9. The data collected by the depart-
ment does not distinguish loss of coverage (people becoming uninsured) from loss of bus-
iness (people finding coverage with another company). See id. Without this information
one cannot tell why people dropped coverage. See id.
203. See id. This determination is most appropriately applied to individuals who
were denied coverage from their employers, rather than people in the individual market.
See id.
204. See id. at 9.
205. See id.
206. See id.
207. See id. (noting that self-insured plans are exempt from state laws, such as
community rating, due to ERISA). First, insurance rates were on the rise overall (Em-
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Comparing these five states allows one to see that the
greatest problems emerged where rate changes were imple-
mented without a phase-in period.208 New York and one carrier
in Maine went to full community rating in one single step and
both suffered as a result of this choice. 20 9 Those states that
phased in the reform law in increments had little trouble with
their new plans. Gradually phasing in a community rating plan,
over a three or four year period, allowed each state to eliminate
adverse rating factors.2 10 The phase-in period has proven to be
beneficial because the insurance market has maintained histori-
cally low rates of inflation.211 The rate increases that New York
saw were diluted in the other states because they were not
much higher than the rates of inflation experienced before
reform.212
V. ASSESSING NEW YORK'S DIFFICULTIES WITH COMMUNITY
RATING
The lack of a phase-in period was not the cause of New
York's community rating difficulties. It was merely part of the
bigger problem of trying to rescue Empire Blue. The irony of the
situation is laughable. Empire Blue was in financial distress
pire Blue was given a 25% rate hike). "However, nationally 1993 was a year of relatively
moderate increases in insurance rates" Id. Second, between 1988 and 1993, health in-
surance coverage decreased throughout the United States. Businesses with over 100 em-
ployees decreased coverage by 12% and medium sized companies decreased coverage by
9.6%. New York's uninsured population rose 1.2% in the year prior to community rating.
Third, employment fluctuation may have also affected the data. Id. at 10.
208. See id. at 11. Three key lessons were revealed by the Special Report. The lead-
ing lesson is to '[pihase in rate restrictions to avoid rate shock" Second, insurers should
"s~hare risks" States should make an effort to spread high risk individuals among the
various insurers. This has proven difficult in states, like New York, where a community-
rated Blue Cross/Blue Shield plan already insured the worst risks. Third, states should
"[i]ntegrate individual and small group markets." Id. at 11-12. But cf Health Reforms
Damaging, Study Claims, THE INsUPANcE REGULATOR, Apr. 15, 1996, at 1 (The combina-
tion of guaranteed issue [also known as open enrollment] and community rating has
caused deterioration in both the health insurance business and to the consumer, accord-
ing to a new report released by the Council for Affordable Health Care [Insurance]
['CAHIT]."). "CAHI is an association of small and mid-sized insurers, brokers, agents and
some physicians based in Alexandria, Va., that espouses market based reform." Id. The
data used for the report was taken from seven reform states, including New York, New
Jersey, Vermont and Massachusetts. See id. The Consumer Federation of American In-
surance Director, Bob Hunter, however, claimed that CABl's findings were "phony" Id.
Hunter criticizes the report for not using data from all insurers. See id.
209. See SPECIAL REPORT, supra note 177, at 11.
210. See id.
211. See id.
212. Id.
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and its rates were soaring faster than anyone could pay for
them.213 The State Legislature, in an effort to save the big Blue,
passed the community rating law with the hope of leveling the
playing field and spreading higher risk individuals to commer-
cial insurers.214 There was no phase-in period because the De-
partment of Insurance was hoping for an easy remedy for the
Empire problem.215 The Department and the Legislature, how-
ever, misjudged the factors which were causing Empire's rates
to increase. 216 Now, Empire's failures are causing New York's
community rating law to fail.
If insurer cherry-picking was the only problem plaguing
Empire, the passage of the community rating law would have
ended the crises, as predicted by Governor Cuomo and Superin-
tendent Curiale.21 7 Since the law's passage, however, Empire has
still been raising its premiums, which in turn has forced people
to drop the expensive coverage. 218 The more that people choose
to go bare, the less of a chance community rating has to
succeed.
Early in 1994, Empire again asked for a rate increase. 21 9
This time it wanted an 8.8% increase that would have affected
993,000 individual and small group community-rated subscrib-
ers.220 Superintendent Curiale denied the increase based on the
continued availability of $94.7 million from the lawsuit and the
anticipated economic gain for Empire due to community rating.
In July of that same year, Governor Cuomo, in a letter to
the Washington Post, admitted that Empire Blue Cross/Blue
Shield was still floundering even with the new community rat-
ing law. In this letter he tried to explain that the law could be
viewed as successful if one ignored Empire's losses. 22' It is diffi-
213. See supra Part 11.
214. See supra Part II.
215. See supra Part II.
216. See supra Part III.-A
217. See supra Part H1.
218. See supra Part I (concerning reaction to community rating reforms).
219. See Superintendent Denies Rate Increase for Empire BC/BS, THE BuLLETmN
(New York State Insurance Department), Apr. 1994, at 1.
220. See id. Empire's CEO, Robert O'Brian, claimed that the increase was needed
because of the "continuing rise in medical cost[s]" and "high utilization of services in the
community-rated segment of the market; and the need to maintain surplus for policy-
holder protection." Id.
221. Community Rating: A Success Story, THE BULLETIN (New York State Insurance
Department), Aug. 1994, at 1. Empire lost 64,000 subscribers in small group and 30,000
in individual. See id. If one were to remove this data, community rating would show an
8.9% increase in coverage or 70,000 people. See id. Including the Empire numbers, how-
ever, results in small group policies increasing by 4,286 subscribers, Medicare gaps in
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cult, if not impossible, however, to ignore how Empire is faring
under the community rating law. To do so would be to ignore
one of the primary reasons for the law's passage, that is, to sta-
bilize Empire Blue and create a level playing field among
insurers.222
The Department of Insurance attempted to refute industry
attacks on community rating by pointing to the annual Federal
Bureau of the Census population survey, released October 6,
1994.22 The survey revealed that "New York State's 1993 unin-
sured rate remained unchanged from 1992, contrary to asser-
tions by the commercial health insurance industry."224 Curiale
used this information to argue that community rating was suc-
ceeding. The Census data showed that for four years prior to
community rating, uninsured numbers grew in the following
way: 1988-10.7%, 1989-11.8%, 1990-12.1%, 1991-12.3%,
1992- 13.9%.225 In 1993, the percentage of uninsured people re-
mained at 13.9%, although the nationwide average rose from
15% to 15.3%.226
The 13.9% figure, when examined out of context, gives the
illusion that community rating may have prevented the rate of
uninsured individuals from increasing. If one looks back on
1993, however, and analyzes the percentage of uninsureds
throughout the year, the meaning behind the 13.9% changes.
Community rating became effective in April 1993.22 Research
has shown that from this date until the end of 1993, the per-
centage of covered individuals dropped 1.2%.228 Looking at the
percentages from this perspective, one can see that prior to com-
munity rating, the number of uninsureds was apparently only
12.7%. The percentage of uninsureds reached 13.9% only after
the passage of community rating. This analysis does not prove
that the increase was caused by community rating,229 but it does
coverage increasing by over 13,000 subscribers, and individual policies decreasing by ap-
proximately 43,000 people. See id.
222. See supra Part 11.
223. See Census Report: NYS Uninsured Rate Unchanged, THE BULLETIN, (New York
State Insurance Department), Sept.-Oct. 1994, at 1. Curiale claimed that Milliman and
Robertson study used 1992 data instead of 1993 to reach uninsured number of 500,000.
See id.
224. Id.
225. See id.
226. See id.
227. See supra notes 77-81 and accompanying text.
228. See SPECIAL REPORT, supra note 177, at 8 & Table A-4.
229. See supra notes 199-213 and accompanying text.
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show that the law has not been the success that the State pur-
ports it to be.
Another obvious sign that community rating is not perform-
ing as promised is the continued rate increases and economic
difficulties of Empire Blue Cross/Blue Shield. According to those
who supported it, the law was supposed to eliminate cherry-
picking and allow Empire to compete on a level playing field.20
The field is not level yet, and Empire is still the legally favored
company.231 Even with the field tilted in the favor of Empire, it
still applied for a rate increase of up to 43.5% for 500,000 of its
customers in 1995.232 The average increase under this request
was 21.4%, which would also affect subscribers with AIDS, can-
cer and other serious diseases.233
Superintendent Edward J. Muh1234 scaled back Empire's re-
quest and only granted a 15.7% increase for its 727,000 individ-
ual, small group and Medicare supplement community-rated
230. See supra Part II.
231. See New York State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers
Ins. Co., 514 U.S. 645 (1995) (explaining that Empire was not required to pay hospital
surcharges whereas commercial carriers were required to pay those surcharges).
232. See Jefrey L. Reynolds, Medical Coverage for All, NEWSDAY, Feb. 16, 1995, at
A41 ("Following enactment of the Community Rating Law... commercial insurers have
stopped selling individual policies or offer only bare-bones plans, leaving Empire as the
only insurer for those who have chronic illnesses.); see also Empire Blue Cross and Blue
Shield: Seeks Rate Increase, HaArET LINE, Dec. 18, 1997, available in LEXIS, News Li-
brary, Hltlne File (discussing rate hikes ranging from 18 to 52% for 15,000 of the in-
surer's customers, this request included a 10% hike for upstate small group policy
holders).
233. See Thomas J. Lueck, Insurer Seeks 21% Increase in Some Rates, N.Y. TIMEs,
Jan. 20, 1995, at A28. In November 1994, Empire announced that it would no longer of-
fer its special comprehensive health care package, used mainly by cancer and AIDS vic-
tims. See id. The company claimed that these policies were costing it millions of dollars.
See id. The 17,000 special comprehensive policy holders would continue to receive ser-
vice. See id. New applicants would instead be offered coverage by an HMO. See id.; see
also Judy Temes et al., Health Care: Taking the Temperature of 40 Health Care Players,
CRAn 's N.Y. Bus., Jan. 23, 1995, at 21 ("Empire's large account business, which has 4.1
million members, lost $22 million in the first nine months of the year, following a $97
million loss in 1993. [The company's] community rated business with 852,000 members
was $100,000 in the red.").
234. Susan Harrigan, Insurance Chief Nominee Got Flak Over Blue Cross, NEWSDAY,
Jan. 17, 1995, at A35. Edward J. Muhl was Governor George Patalki's choice as a re-
placement for Superintendent Curiale. See id. Muhi was Maryland's insurance commis-
sioner from 1982 to 1988. See id. He then became vice president of "an insurance com-
pany that is 49.5% owned by Saul Steinberg, a New York financier who was the second-
largest donor to Pataki's gubernatorial campaign" See id. This past job made Muhl re-
sponsible for government and industry relations, which included lobbying. See id. Muhl
is also a former president of the National Association of Insurance Commissioners. See
id.
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subscribers.2 5 Muhl demanded that the "company achieve cost
savings, become more efficient, and expand its product line to
include HI-MOs."2 6
In the past, Empire refused to develop a managed care al-
ternative for the direct pay market.237 It has also refused to im-
plement necessary changes such as providing an out-of-network
option and limited prescription drug benefits with a managed
care product.23 8 Superintendent Muhl also wanted increased
fraud detection. In 1994, with limited efforts, Empire uncovered
twenty-five million dollars in fraud. The Department believed
the company could detect up to forty million dollars in fraud in
1995.239 Muhl was displeased with Empire's administrative
costs 240 because it continued to pay executives exorbitant bo-
nuses while it was struggling to find its identity in the market
place.2 1 The 1995 administrative costs were expected to be 9.4%
of the premiums. Superintendent Muhl wanted this figure to be
only 7%, as it had been in the past.22 The declining enrollment
would support this percentage.243
These criticisms are similar to those made by the Senate
staff that investigated Empire. In 1993, the staff determined
that cherry-picking was not the most serious problem facing
Empire and that more than community rating was needed to
save the non-profit company.244 Superintendent Curiale, how-
235. See Empire BC/BS Rate Decision Announced, THE BULLETIN (New York State
Insurance Department), Mar. 1995, at 1-2 [hereinafter Rate Decision Announced, THE
BULLETIN].
236. Id. But see Department Ranks Health Insurers According to Complaints, BusI.
NESS WImE, Dec. 24, 1997, at 1, available in LxS, News Library, Wires File (explaining
that, in the overall ranking for complaints handled by insurance carriers, Empire moved
up from 52 to 32).
237. See Rate Decision Announced, THE BULLEMN, supra note 235, at 2.
238. See id.
239. See id.
240. See id.
241. See id.; see also Rosemary Metzler Lavan, Pols Targeting Empire's Raises,
DAILY NEWS, Mar. 10, 1995, at 26. State Senate Republican leaders planned to propose
legislation that would have prohibited Empire executives from receiving raises or bo-
nuses when the company lost money. See Lavan, supra. Executives received a six-figure
bonus and salary package in 1994, while Empire lost $118 million. See id. "Empire's new
chief executive officer Michael Stecker received salary and other compensation totaling
$482,000, including a $300,000 signing bonus, for just two months' employment." Id.
Other executives, G. Robert O'Brien and Philip Briggs, received similar packages. See id.
The proposed legislation would require the state to approve any salary increase for Em-
pire employees earning more than $100,000 per year. See id.
242. See Rate Decision Announced, THE BULLETIN, supra note 235, at 2.
243. See id.
244. See supra notes 135-62 and accompanying text (discussing Senate staff findings
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ever, insisted this law would solve the company's economic di-
lemmas.2 5 The department, under Superintendent Muhl,26 how-
ever, began realizing that community rating is not Empire's
panacea. 7 This realization has continued through the beginning
of 1998. The current superintendent, Neil Levin, denied another
rate increase request from Empire in April 1998.m The Pataki
administration, however, has announced that it will support
Empire and other insurers who provide individual coverage by
providing them with $110 million in State assistance.2 9 Of this
$110 million from the State, Empire is scheduled to receive
$16.8 million.250
The Legislature and the Department of Insurance made two
promises when community rating was proposed and passed.
First, they promised that community rating would increase the
number of people with health insurance in New York.251 Unfor-
tunately, this increase has not materialized. In fact, the number
of people with insurance in New York has decreased. 22 Depend-
that Empire was poorly managed and losses were not due to cherry-picking); see also
Scott Hensley, Empire Ex-CFO Convicted: Jury Finds Former Blues Official Lied,
Doctored Records, MODERN HEALTHcARE, Mar. 10, 1997, at 44. Former Blue Cross-Blue
Shield executive, Jerry Weissman, was convicted for lying to the Senate committee dur-
ing its investigation. See Hensley, supra. In addition to lying to the Senate, Weissman
had given doctored documents to the panel in an effort to hide Empire's book-keeping
methods. See id.
245. See supra notes 163-73 and accompanying text (concerning Superintendent
Curiale's testimony at Senate hearing with respect to how community rating would
boost Empire's fortunes).
246. New York Banking Chief Gets Insurance Nod, J. CoM., Feb. 25, 1997, at 8A,
available in DIALOG (revealing that Governor George Pataki nominated Neil D. Levin,
the then current superintendent of banking, to replace Edward Muhl who had resigned
in January of 1997).
247. See supra notes 233-43 and accompanying text (discussing Superintendent
Muhl's criticisms and demands of Empire).
248. See Ian Fisher, Albany Will Pay Health Insurers to Freeze Rates, N.Y. TIMES,
Apr. 22, 1998, at Al (revealing that 110,000 New Yorkers purchase individual health in-
surance and that the request would have caused up to a 69% increase in those
premiums).
249. See id.
250. See Claire Hughes, Health Insurers Say Direct-Pay Plans Costly, TIMES UNION,
Apr. 23, 1998, at El (explaining that an Empire rate increase would have caused in-
sureds to be burdened with an additional $24 million in premiums).
251. See supra notes 82-91 and accompanying text (offering background on the na-
ture and purposes of community rating).
252. See supra notes 197-202 and accompanying text (concerning an analysis of the
Special Report on New York's community rating plan as well as the State's decrease in
health insurance coverage). In New York, community rating caused rates for single
young males to jump 170%. See Tony Snow, Dole's Bad Medicine Health-Reform Plan
Would Raise Costs, Hurt Quality, USA TODAY, Mar. 25, 1996, at l1A (critically compar-
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ing on how one interprets the data available, it is quite possible
that community rating was responsible for this decrease. 253
The second promise made by the State was that community
rating would end cherry-picking, and thus relieve Empire Blue
Cross/Blue Shield from being the insurer of last resort.254 Em-
pire, however, remained the dominant health insurer in the
state, largely due to the fact that it had continued to provide
both individual policies and free choice of doctors and prescrip-
tion drugs.255 Cherry-picking was no longer an issue, yet Empire
continued to increase its rates and undergo internal transi-
tions.256 These ongoing problems for Empire indicate that the
ing "The Health Insurance Reform Act of 1995" to New York's community rating plan).
Young and healthy people dropped out of the system by the thousands, while older
sicker citizens entered the system. See id. The average medical claim in New York
doubled to $7,900. See id. After three years of community rating, 320,000 fewer people
are insured in New York. See id. It is too early to determine if the Health Insurance Re-
form Act (also known as Kassebaum-Kennedy Bill or Portability and Accountability Act)
will have the same affects on health insurance as did community rating in New York.
Other factors, such as Empire Blue, have caused decreases in insureds in New York. The
basic theory of adverse selection, however, will be a formidable opponent to the new
Health Reform Act which was passed in August of 1996. See Health Insurance Portabil-
ity and Accountability Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-191, 110 Stat. 1936 (1996). A key
provision of this law is that it limits preexisting condition provisions and gives employ-
ees credit for coverage in a prior group. See ASSOCIATION OF HEALTH INSURANCE AGENTS,
HEALTH INSURANCE PORTABILiTY AND AccouNTABILITy ACT OF 1996, P.L. 104-191 (1996)
(report of the Standing Committee) (on file with Buffalo Law Review). The Association of
Health Insurance Agents (AHIA) reported that the law has established new require-
ments for self-funded, fully insured group plans, as well as for individual health policies.
See id. The AHIA report also explains the law and provides answers to many commonly
asked questions with respect to how the law will affect group and individual insurance.
See id. Pertinently, The Portability Act contains provisions for guaranteed issue; provi-
sions also present in community rating. See id.
253. See discussion supra notes 214-30 and accompanying text.
254. See supra notes 76-92 and accompanying text.
255. Dena Bunis, Blue Cross Premiums: Up Again; But Insurer Says Hike Short of
What It Needs, NEWSDAY, Mar. 3, 1995, at A05.
256. Barbara Benson, Empire Chief Shuffles Execs, Plans Layoffs, CIAIN'S N.Y. Bus.,
Jan. 23, 1995, at 1. Empire's new president, Michael Stocker, overhauled senior manage-
ment and changed the focus of the company towards managed care. Id.; see also
Serbaroli, supra note 32, at 3 (discussing Empire Blue joining a national trend in Blue
Cross/Blue Shield moving from non-profit to for-profit). Empire "proposed the creation of
two for-profit subsidiaries that could eventually assume most of its health insurance
business. [The] proposal received preliminary approval from the New York State Insur-
ance Department' Serbaroli, supra. The approval resulted in massive protests from con-
sumer advocates. See id. Hospital associations and the state medical society expressed
concern over the plan. See id. The proposal went to the Attorney General's office for re-
view in the summer of 1996. See id.; see also Barbara Benson, Empire IPO Languishes
As State Dallies: Insurer Cleans Up Balance Sheet, but Delay May Hamper Its Revival,
CRAi's N.Y. Bus., Mar. 17, 1997, at 1 [hereinafter Benson, Empire IPO Languishes). In
March of 1997, Empire president Mike Stocker expressed his hope that the conversion
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U.S. Senate Subcommittee's findings were more accurate than
the State Department of Insurance was willing to admit.257
The continued failure of Empire Blue, combined with the
overall rate increases or market-fleeing by other insurers, is
forcing thousands of individuals to go without insurance. 258
Community rating cannot become successful until Empire be-
comes economically stabilized and other insurers are forced to
compete with the insurer of last resort.259
Even if community rating becomes successful, it will not
remedy the health insurance crisis that faces the nation. Com-
munity rating will only be an intermediary step towards larger
reform, such as a single-government-payer system. Unfortu-
approval would come "as soon as possible. Benson, Empire IPO Languishes, supra, at 1.
Stocker's concern was undoubtedly due in part to the fact that Empire needed to convert
to for-profit status by the end of 1997 or face a heavy tax burden on appreciated assets.
See id. Stocker pointed out that although Empire was financially stronger, its "1996 ad-
ministrative costs were so high that [Empire] lost money on operationsf Id. The com-
pany's premium levels fell in 1996 and its underwriting losses continued during the
same year. See id.
257. See supra Part M.A; see also Hughes, supra note 250, at El (revealing that the
State Insurance Department recently admitted that Empire's poor management of ad-
ministrative costs played a significant role in Empire's difficulties). The Insurance De-
partment's admission, however, does not seem to imply that the State will act to remedy
the problem. Rather, the new policy appears to involve the State pointing fingers and
throwing money at this difficult situation. See Hughes, supra (discussing the $110 mil-
lion disbursement to insurers).
258. See supra notes 119-34, 197-212 and accompanying text (discussing, among
other issues, the number of uninsured in New York State); see also Alden Levy, New
York's Ailing Health Care, J. COM., Jan. 9, 1997, at 6A ('After three years of community
rating in New York, average premiums are 16.8% higher and the system insures 320,000
fewer people."). Mr. Levy is a business consultant in the health-care field. See Levy,
supra, at 6A. He is also on the board of directors of "Third Millennium, a nonprofit advo-
cacy group founded by people in their 20s and 30s to deal with social issues." Id. He has
recently returned to New York and found that no company in the State is willing to
write catastrophic health coverage (coverage for such things as being hit by a car). See
id. He also notes that a young person who purchases an "all-inclusive" health insurance
policy today in New York will pay the same rate as a 65 year old who has been smoking
three packs of cigarettes a day for the past 40 years. See id. Not surprisingly, the aver-
age age of policyholders jumped by 3.5 years after the passage of community rating. See
id Mr. Levy is not the only one who dislikes community rating. See eg., 1995 NY A.B.
5922, 218th Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 1995) (bill to repeal community rating introduced by
State Assembly members Brown, Calhoun and Townsend-multi-sponsored by Anderson,
Davidsen, King, McGee, Nortz, F.T. Sullivan and Winner). A bill repealing community
rating, however, would undoubtedly encounter a great deal of opposition because com-
munity rating favors a large and relatively active segment of the voting population (that
is, voters who are 45-65 years old).
259. Adverse selection will continue to plague the state. See AKB. 8713, 219th Leg.,
Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 1996) ("An act to amend the legislative law and the insurance law, in re-
lation to mandated health insurance benefits").
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nately, various states' use of community rating and other simi-
lar reforms drives up the cost of insurance and forces more peo-
ple to go bare. This, in turn, makes larger national reforms
more difficult and expensive to implement. The longer the fed-
eral government waits to take control of health care, the more
ad hoc the system becomes. 260 No cure for the nation's health
care problems can be found in such a band-aid process.
260. See Dan Wise, While Disenchantment with Big Government Solutions Has Put
Their Reform on Hold, Most States Seek Greater Flexibility To Implement Managed Care
Solutions, BusiNEss & HALTH, Jan. 1, 1995, at 61. "Forty-four states have enacted
small-group market reforms to guarantee access to health insurance for individuals with
pre-existing medical conditions." Id. Of this number, twenty states have adopted some
form of community rating. See id. At least another twenty "are encouraging managed
competition experiments, such as purchasing alliances that enable small group purchas-
ers collectively to command more choice and better prices on health insurance." Id. Phy-
sician-hospital organizations (PHOs), which are similar to HMOs, have been exempted
from anti-trust laws in fifteen states. See id. "Incremental reform seems to be the order
of the day." Id. (citation omitted).
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